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I N T H E S U P R E M E C 0 U R T 
0 F T H E S T A T E 0 F U T A H 
CRAIG A. BLAMIRES, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 15676 
D E F E N D A N T ' S B R I E F 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action before the Supreme Court of Utah pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 35-4-10(i), as amended, for the purpose 
of judicial review of and determination of the lawfulness of a decision of 
the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, affirming the 
decision of the Appeals Referee denying benefits to Plaintiff on the grounds 
that during the base period July 1, 1976, through June 30, 1977, the Plain-
tiff was not an employee of Medexam but was self-employed, and that during 
said base period Plaintiff had insufficient weeks of employment for eligi-
bility. The questions are whether the Plaintiff was in "employment" as 
defined in the Utah Employment Security Act and case law, and whether the 
decision of the Board of Review is supported by substantial evidence in the 
record. 
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DISPOSITION BY BOARD OF REVIEW, 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Plaintiff was disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation 
benefits in a review decision of a Department Representative dated Sept~­
ber 22, 1977. The qecision was affirmed pya Department Appeals Referee in 
a decision dated December 8, 1977, and the decision of the Appeals Referee 
was affirmed by the Board of Review in a decision dated January 24, 1978, 
in Case No. 77-A-3553, 77-BR-301. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW 
Defendant Board of Review of the Industrial Connnnission of Utah 
seeks affirmation of the decision denying benefits to Plaintiff on the 
grounds that said decision is supported by substantial evidence and that 
Plaintiff was not in the "employ" of Medexam as defined in the Act and 
case law, and thus had insufficient weeks of employment during his base 
period to qualify. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Medexam is a Utah based corporation which is engaged in the 
business of administering physical examinations. Their principal clienb 
are insurance companies for the purpose of underwriting risks. They also 
perform physical examinations for other firms such as employment physicals, 
ICC physicals, etc. (R.0022 and 0063) 
Medexam enters into an agreement with various insurance companies 
and others to conduct physical examinations for them and a fee is agreed to 
according to the type of examination performed. (R.0038) 
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For the purpose of establishing clinics OP franchises to per~ 
the examinations, Medexam enters into an agreement with individuals same-
times referred to as "partnership" agreements and someSimes referru to as. 
"licensing" agreements. (R.0039-0040) Such individuals have para-p~fes- _ 
sional backgrounds, i.e., training and experience to enable th~ to do the 
work. In the instant case no written agreement was signed. The verbal 
agreement provided that at the outset Plaintiff should receive seventy 
percent of the gross receipts, which was later changed to ninety percent 
(R.0041) and that Medexam should receive the balance. Medexam was tope 
paid directly by the insurance companies or other firms and Medexam was 
to disburse Plaintiff's share to him at an agreed time once a month. 
(R.0042) 
Prior to entering into the verbal franchise arrangement with 
Medexam, Plaintiff had been employed as a physical examiner by Body Metrics 
for whom he worked for wages. (R.0036) Plaintiff had received training 
from the Louisiana College of Nursing and had served as a medic in the 
military and was qualified as an emergency medical technician. (R.0037) 
In September 1976 Plaintiff pursuant to said verbal franchise agreement 
established a clinic or outlet to operate in Ogden, Utah, to take over an 
operation that had previously been established in said city, initially 
working out of his own home. (R.0037) The Plaintiff acquired his cli-
ents by contacting and soliciting various agents of insurance companies 
directly and some were referred to him by Medexam. (R.0037) Plaintiff 
contacted, interviewed, hired, trained, and paid examiners which he 
referred to as "sa tel 1 ites" to conduct physical examinations in Brigham 
City and Logan, Utah, and in Preston and Pocatello, Idaho. (R.0041 • 0042, 
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·.· " 
0049) In May of 1977 Plaintiff rented office space in Ogden, Utah, under 
the franchise trade name "Medexam" and paid all of his business expenses 
through his own checking account and handled his books and records regard-
ing the business. (R.0042, 0047) 
The Pla1ntiff and Medexam term~pated their business relationship 
by mutual agreement on the 23rd of July 1977 after two days of discussions. 
(R.0045) Plaintiff voluntarily gave up his rights as a franchisee. He 
refused to attend meetings called by Medexam to define and clarify the 
relationship between the parties. (R.0043) It is understandable that he 
refused to sign the "partnership" agreement proffered by Medexam because 
it did not fit the situation. However, Plaintiff refused to participate 
in the process necessary to clarify the relationship between the parties 
to enable a written formalization thereof. The situation reached an 
impasse and the parties mutually terminated it. (R.0043-0044) 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PLAINTIFF CRAIG A. BLAMIRES 
AND MEDEXAM OF UTAH WAS A FRANCHISE ARRANGEMENT RATHER 
THAN AN EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP OR PARTNERSHIP. 
Plaintiff claims his status in this case was that of an employee. 
The record refers to a "partnership agreement" (R.0027-0034) which Plain-
tiff refused to sign. Said writing entitled "partnership agreement" did 
not set forth the true relationship between Plaintiff Blamires and Medexam, 
and it is thus not surprising that Plaintiff Blamires refused to sign it. 
(R.0045-0046) Mr. Reginald Ron Smith, President of Medexam Associates, 
Inc., a Utah corporation (R.0036 and 0043), hereinafter referred to as 
"Medexam," stated that originally said agreement was referred to as a 
"licensing agreement," then called "partnership," and then switched back 
• to "1 i cens i ng agreement," with no difference as to the contents, only a 
matter· of semantics. (R.0039-0040) 
During the ten years immediately preceding the first publi-
cation of this work, franchising had mushroomed as a means 
of expanding an ever-widening variety of businesses, thereby 
enabling a large number of companies to achieve nationwide 
distribution of their products and services within a short 
space of time and with a comparatively small outlay of their 
own capital. Simultaneously, innumerable individuals with 
little capital found through franchising a way to achieve 
the status of an independent businessman under the guidance 
of an experienced cympany and backed by the reputation of a 
well-known product . 
. . . a franchise is a license from the owner of a trademark 
or trade ·name permitting another to sell a product or ser-
vice under that name or mark. The trademark and the trade 
name have been called "the cornerstone of a franchise system." 
The license granted cannot be a naked one. :he owner of.the 
mark or name has a duty to the public to pollee the qual1t~ 
of the product or service marketed under the mark or name. 
115 Business Organizations, Glickman, Franchising, page 1-1. 
2rd page 2-1. 
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•.• The franchise has evolved as an elaborate agreement 
under which the franchisee undertakes to conduct business 
or sell a product or service in accordance with methods and 
procedures prescribed by the franchisor and the franchisor 
undert~kes to assist the.franchisee through advertising, 
promot1on, and othe~ adv~sory services. The franchise may 
encompass an exclus1ve r1ght to sell the product in a spe-
cified territory.3 
Also, another definition of franchise: 
... an arrangement whereby a firm (franchisor) which has 
developed a pattern or formula for the conduct of a parti-
cular kind of business extends to other firms (franchisees) 
the right to engage in the business provided they follow 
the established pattern.4 
The Federal Trade Commission has observed: 
The essence of any franchise system is the establishment 
of quasi-independent businessmen subject to various con-
trols respecting their business operations, the nature of 
which depends in part on the philosophy of the franchisor 
and on the nature of the products and services franchised. 
However, some form of control over the franchisee is an 
essential ingredient of the franchise system.5 
Most franchises involve the sale of a product or service 
to the consumer. Thus, most franchises are classified as 
retail businesses. Basically, they fall into three cate-
gories: 
3rd page 2-2. 
(2) Chain-style businesses, under which the franchisee 
operates his business under the franchisor's trade 
name, is identified as a member of a select group of 
dealers, and generally is required to follow stand-
ardized or prescribed methods of operation. Under 
this arrangement, the franchisor may control the 
franchisee as to such matters as the location and 
page 2-2.1, referring to statement of Eugene P. Foley, hearings pursuant 
to S. Res. 40 on S. 1842, S. 1843 and S. 1844, before Senate Subconm. on 
Antitrust and Monopoly, 89th Cong., 1st Se~s. (1965) .. The speak~r wasof, 
addressing himself primarily to the franch1sor who 1s 1n the b~slnessl t! 
selling franchises as distinguished from the manufacturer seek1ng out e 
for a specific product. See Section 2.02 infra. 
. h · · g sub· page 2-2.1, referring to report of Ad Hoc Comm1ttee on Franc 1s1n69 na mitted to the Federal Trade Commission by its staff on June 2, 19 t' a 
announced by the FTC on December 10, 1969, quoting FTC Memorandum 0 
SBA p. 4 (March 10, 1966). 
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appearance of his place of business, the products 
sold or used, his bookkeeping methods, advertising 
and sales methods, appearance and qualification of 
pe~sonngl, hours of business, territory served, . 
pr1ces. 
The record in this case clearly manifests a franchise type of 
operation rather than partnership or employer-employee. Medexam had devel-
oped a pattern of performing services for insurance compan~e.s,: f.e., doing 
physical examinations on individuals in connection with applications for 
insurar.ce policies. Plaintiff as the franchisee undertook to sell the 
service in accordance with the procedures prescribed by the franchisor 
(Medexam). Medexam assisted Plaintiff Blamires through promotion and advi-
sory services. (R.0038} Plaintiff was granted exclusive right to sell the 
services in a specified territory, Northern Utah and Idaho. Some control 
over the Plaintiff was maintained by the franchisor in accordance with the 
usua 1 duty to the pub 1 i c of a franchisor as owner of the trade name "Medexam" 
to police the quality of the service marketed under said trade name. 
The relationship clearly was not that of a joint venture or· part-
nership. There was no joint control or right of control. Plaintiff 
controlled the operation of his office in Ogden and the satellite offices 
he set up. As between Medexam and Plaintiff there was no joint proprietary 
interest in the operation or right to share in the profits or duty to share 
in any losses. Plaintiff ran his own operation. He paid Medexam thirty 
percent at first, then later on ten percent, as a franchise fee for use of 
the trade name "Medexam" and for the right to participate in performing 
physical examinations under the contracts which Medexam had set up with the 
various insurance companies. Plaintiff paid his own expenses--rent, travel, 
6Id pages 2.2-12, 2.3. 
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secretary, satellite operation, equipment (in fact he leased an EKG machine 
from Medexam) without any participation from Medexam.7 
POINT II 
THE FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND MEDEXAM 
IS S~MILAR TO A VENDOR-VENDEE OR LESSOR-LESSEE RELATIONSHIP 
l~ THE SENSE THAT IT IS NOT A SERVICE RELATIONS~IP UNDER 
SECTION 35-4-22(j)(l) OF THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT, 
AND THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSION BEING SUPPORTED BY SUB-
STANTIAL EVIDENCE SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
The applicable provisions of the Utah Employment Security Act are 
as follows: 
22(j)(l) "Employment" means any service ••• performed for 
wages or under agy contract of hire written or oral, express 
or implied ••• 
22(j)(5) Services performed by an individual for wages or 
under any contract of hire, written or oral, express or im-
plied, shall be deemed to be employment subject to this act 
unless and until it is shown to the satisfaction of the 
commission that: 
(A) Such individual has been and will continue to 
be free from control or direction over the performance 
of such services, both under his contract of hire and 
in fact; 
(B) Such service is either outside the usual course 
of the business for which such service is performed 
or that such service is performed outside of all the 
places of business of the enterprise for which such 
service is performed; and 
(C) Such individual is customarily engaged in an 
independently established trade, occupation, ~rofes­
sion, or business of the same nature as that 1nvolved 
in the contract of service.9 
The Utah Supreme Court has in the past held that vendor-vendee and 
lessor-lessee relationships do not come within Section 22(j)(l) because theY 
7see Joint Venture distinguished from Franchise, Id pages 2-31, 2-32, 2-33· 
Butah Code Annotated 1953, 35-4-22(j)(1). 
9utah Code Annotated 1953, 35-4-22(j)(5). 
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are not service relationships. Another category should llle -.111M tp .. ,_... 
service class, and that is the bona fide franchise relat10RShi~ 
True vendor-vendee or a lessee-lessor relationshi.p are aet 
service relationships. They fall in the non-service cate~ 
gory.lO 
The fir~t test comes under 19(j)(l): Was the applicattt 
perform1ng services for wages or under a contract of -ire? 
Under this test it must be detennined whether he falls 
under those contractual relationships which are in the 
non-service class, such as vendor-vendee or lessor-lessee 
relationship. If the applicant survives this test he 
must meet the next inclusion-exclusion test under this 
hierarchy, to wit: that of 19(j)(5), where if the c~ 
mission is satisfied that the conditions of the (a), (b), 
and (c) clauses concur, the applicant is eliminated from 
participation ••. 11 
The California Department of Employment Tax Manual treats leases 
and franchise arrangements the same as respects the tests to detennine whether 
a bona fide lease or franchise arrangement exists. 
Bona fide lessees operating independently established 
businesses are independent contractors. A bona fide 
lessee conducts business under his own name; hires and 
pays any necessary assistants; takes out any required 
business licenses in his own name; keeps his own books; 
collects and advances credit when and to whom he pleases; 
collects his own accounts; pays his own business expenses, 
and in short, operates free from any direction and control 
by the owner of the premises. So, where the agreement 
regulates his hours of work; requires that money accruing 
from services performed by the lessee be paid to the 
lessor; gives the lessor control or authority over 
assistants hired by the alleged lessee; and allows the 
lessor to terminate the relationship either at will or 
within a reasonably short period an employment relatio~­
ship will generally exist. Other pertinent factors wh1ch 
will tend to establish an employment relationship are the 
direct payment of wages by the lessor to either the les-
see or his assistants, keeping the alleged lessee's b?oks 
of account by the lessor, handling by the lessor of blll-
ings to customers for work done by the alleged lessee, 
right of the lessor to restrict granting of credit by 
the lessee and similar factors. t 7005.30 (May 30, 1946), 
1°FuZZer Brush Company v. Industrial Commission, 99 Ut. 97, 104 P. 2d 
201 (1940}. 
11Logan Cache Knitting Mitts v. Industrial Commission, 99 Ut. 1, 102 P. 2d 
495 (1940). 
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quoted i~ C.C.H. Unemp. Ins. Rep. (Cal.) t 1332.) Although 
couched 1n terms of lease arrangements, the same reasoning 
has been applied to franchise arrangements.lZ 
Section 22(j)(l) of the Employment Security Act quoted above and 
Section 22(p), to wit: 
22(p) "Wages" means all remuneration for personal services 
including commissions and bonuses and the cash value of all 
remuneration in any medium other than cash. Gratuities cus-
tomarily received by an individual in the course of his 
employment from persons other than his employing unit shall 
be treated as wages received from his employing unit. The 
reasonable cash value of remuneration in any medium other 
than cash and the reasonable amount of gratuities shall be 
estimated and determined in accordance with rules prescribed 
by the commission; .•. 
"define generally the contractual relationships which are believed to be the , 
bases from which springs the kind of unemployment that •.. is by Section 1 ~ 
! 
(of the Utah Employment Security Act) declared to be an economic menace to 
the public." 13 
These two sections cSections 22(j)(l) and 22(p)J define 
contractual relationships which we term service relation-
ships. Examples of these are: employer and employee, 
master and servant, principal and agent, and principal and 
independent contractor. They are distinguished from non-
service relationships such as vendor and vendee, or lessor 
and lessee, in that the factor that induced their execution 
is the desire of one contracting party for the service of 
the other, and the desire of the latter to render that ser-
vice. The non-service relationships mentioned, however, 
arise from a desire to dispose of and a desire to acquire 
either permanently or temporarily property interests. For 
example: I learn that my neighbor wants to sell his auto-
mobile; he learns that I want to buy a second-hand car. 
We get together, it matters not how. I agree to buy and 
he agrees to sell. The factor that induced this contract 
was our desires as to a property transfer. Suppose that 
I, for reasons best known to myself--Scotch if you wish--
desire to pay for the car in labor, the labor to be per-
formed under his control and direction. He is agreeable. 
1215 Business Organizations, Glickman, Franchising, p. 2-9, 2-10, referring 
to California Dept. of Employment Tax Manual. 
l3combined Metals Reduction Company v. Industrial Commission, 101 Ut. 230 • 
116 P. 2d 929 (1941). 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
hired, trained, and paid his own staff of four satellite operatflftS fn fOur 
other cities in Utah and Idaho, and paid his own overhead ex~ tnclldtng 
travel. Plaintiff was very irritated when the frlftchfsor fn t~ person of 
Mr. Smith attempted to interfere with or exercise any control over the oper-
ation of what he considered to be his in4ependent business, Plaintiff con-
sidered himself to be an independent businessman for tax purposes. Plaintiff 
admits that the nature of the relationship between himself and Medexam was 
"fuzzy" and uncertain and states that the relationship "evolved into where 
I believed I was a contractor." (R.0042) 
The evidence in this case is well within the rule regarding appel-
late review set forth in the Salt Lake Tribune Publishing Company case16 and 
the Logan Cache Knitting Mills case17 that the decision of the Commission 
will not be upset if there is substantial evidence to support the finding of 
the Board of Review • 
. . . The evidence set out above is ample to support the 
finding of the Commission. • • • At all events the evidence 
is such that we cannot say that the Commission must, as 
reasonable menA have found that the claimant was free from 
such contro1.1c 
In the following cases it was held that questions on rela-
tionship of employer-employee, number of employees, etc., 
are "jurisdictional facts" on which the appellate court 
will "review and heig~ the evidence certified in the record" 
to determine whet er ommission had jurisdiction. (Cases 
cited.) In these cases the court considered the evidence 
anew and determined what conclusion should have been reached 
on those facts and, on the basis of its conclusion, affirmed 
or reversed. 
The Utah cases are to this effect: (Cases cited). 
16gg Ut. 259, 102 P. 2d 307 (1940). 
17gg Ut. 1, 102 P. 2d 495 (1940). 
l8sazt Lake Tribune Publishing Company v. Induetri4l COimlieeion, Id. 
12 
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Has the contract becom~ any the less a contract of sale? No. 
The fact that the cons1deration has become in whole or in 
part labor instead of cash does not change the contract. 
Furthermore, an unexpected termination of that sales contract 
does not produce a case of unemployment which is an economic 
menace to the public. 
Contrast the above illustration with the following: I am a 
carpenter. My neighbor wants a chicken coop built. I want 
to build it. We get together. He is short of cash but is 
willing to give me his automobile in payment. I don't want 
an automobile, b~t as I can sell it and get my pay that way, 
I accept. What 1nduced the contract? A desire for and a 
desire to render services. The fact that the consideration 
was payable in whole or in part by property instead of cash 
did not change the nature of the contract. I take the auto-
mobile as "remuneration payable in any medium other than 
cash" (quoting from Section 19(p) above). 
In each illustration the important question is: what induced 
the parties to enter into the contractual relationship? If 
the service factor, it falls within Sections 19(j)(l) and 
19(p); if the non-service factor, then those sections exclude 
the contractual relationship from the benefits of the Unem-
ployment Compensation Law.l4 
Applying the above tests to the instant case we have a typical 
franchise situation where the franchisee, the Plaintiff, is seeking to acqui~ 
; 
a property interest, i.e., a business of his own, utilizing the trade name [ 
of "Medexam," under the guidance of an experienced company and backed by the 
I 
rep uta ti on of services we 11 known and estab 1 i shed in the insurance i ndustry.E' 
I 
The record supports the finding of the Referee and the Board of 1 
Review that Plaintiff's objective was to acquire a business rather than to 
render a service for Medexam. As mentioned in Point IV, Plaintiff set up 
his own office, paid the rent, hired a secretary, terminated one secretary 
and hired another, arranged for his own phone, obtained his own equipment, 
contacted insurance agents directly to promote his own business, recruited, 
14Id, dissent of Justice Pratt on the facts, but the above statement of 
the law is not disputed. 
15see Footnote 1, Supra. 
11 
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Most courts, however, have held that commission findints of 
employer-employee relationship, number of employees etc. 
are binding on the reviewing court unless there is ~nab-' 
sence of substantial evidence in the record. (Cases cited.) 
The statement is common throughout these cases that the 
finding of the Commission on points, regarding which there 
is conflicting evidence, is conclusive and that the court 
is without power to review the evidence. Most of the cases 
were appealed beca~se of ~ fin~ing of employer-em~loyee 
re~ationship but the cour~s ~eld Commission f,~ndings on this 
po1nt conclusive. It should be .no~d that there are hold-
ings both ways in California and Olino.is. · . . 
I think as a matter of policy the courts should nQt att~pt 
to substitute their judgment for that of Commissions who 
gain experience by constant dealing with administration of 
the Acts which created them. Certainly such bodies should 
become expert in making factual conclusions. For that rea-
son I think the line between jurisdictional and non-juris-
dictional facts should not be extended further than necessary 
to act as a justifiable check on the administrative tribunal 
and that the review should be almost altogether on questions 
of law. A further reason is that any extension of the scope 
of review puts additional burdens upon the courts which are 
already overburdened.19 
The decision in the instant case being supported by substantial 
evid~nce should be affirmed. 
POINT III 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS DEPARTED FROM THE SECTION 22{j) (5)(C) TEST AS PRONOUNCED IN THE LEACH V. BOARD OF REVI&W 
CASE20 AND OTHER PRIOR CASES BY VfRTUE OF ITS DECISION IN 
THE NORTH AMERICAN BUILDERS CASE2 AND HAS SET A NEW STAND-
ARD FOR SATISFYING "C" OF THE "ABC" TEST. THE "C" TEST IS 
SATISFIED IN THE INSTANT CASE. 
The basic point of contention involved (j)(S)~C); were the 
installers engaged in an independently establ1shed trade or 
business of the same nature as that involved in the contract 
of service?22 
l9Jct Logan cache Knitting MiZZs v. IndustriaZ Commission, discussion of 
Justice Wolfe in dissent on other grounds. 
20H. L. & Irene Leach d/b/a/ Rusco Wind.ow CoTTTpany v. Board of Review, 123 Ut. 
423, 260 P. 2d 744 (1953). 
21 North ~erican BuiZders v. UneTTTpZoyment CoTTTpensation Division, 22 Ut. 2d 
338, 453 P. 2d 142 (1969) 
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• 
The court in North American Builders concluded that the installers 
of metal siding were self-employed craftsmen who performed their services 
for the supplier of the siding materials while in pursuit of an independentl) 
established trade in which they were customarily engaged. 
A contrary conclusion was reached in Leach. However, there 
are significant differences. The instaTTers in Leach were 
trained by the suppliers after,which they ~ntered into a 
written contract to perform the service necessary to install 
the products in a workmanlike manner; the installers were 
regularly employed elsewhere; and, the suppliers were the 
sole distributors in Utah of Rusco Windows and products and 
thus were the on~ persons who could accept orders and sup-
ply the windows. 
The "significant differences" from Leach referred to above are 
present in the instant case. The Plaintiff was not trained by Medexam. He 
was already well trained by virtue of schooling, military service, and employ· 
ment with Body Metrics. (R.0036 and 0037) In the instant case there is no 
contract to perform the physical examinations in any particular manner. 
There is no evidence to indicate that Medexam exercised any direction or 
control over the manner or means by which the Plaintiff accomplished the 
physical examinations. Medexam's only interest was to police the quality 
' I 
i 
I 
I 
of the service rendered under its trade name the same as any other fran- i 
chisor. In the instant case, Plaintiff was not regularly employed elsewhere. 1 
Also Medexam is not the sole provider of the physical examinations for ' 
insurance companies in the State of Utah. According to the record there 
is at least one other--Body Metrics. (R.0036) 
The Utah Supreme Court in the North American Builders case, supra, 
has followed the Indiana case of ALumiwaLL Corporation v. Indiana emplo~@t 
23rct. 
14 
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Seaur'ity Board24 and has quoted the following from said case as ·• IUille.,tf• , ... 
applying test "C" of the "ABC" test: 
The second standard is whether or not such services were 
an independently established trade, occupation profession 
or business. Again it would seem that such applicators· 
were engaged in an independent business. They owned and 
supplied their own tools and equipment, hired and fired 
their own helpers, were free to work or not to work as they 
saw fit, and could perform the same services for other than 
appellant if they so desired.25 
Applying the criteria quoted from the Alumiwall case to the instant 
case the "C" test is satisfied. Plaintiff owned or leased or rented his own 
office, equipment and facilities, phone, etc., he hired and fired his own 
helpers. Plaintiff set his own appointments to perform physical examinations. 
He was not regulated by Medexam as to when he worked or didn't work. He was 
free to work or not to work as he saw fit. No doubt he worked whenever he 
had the chance, but such is the case with many independent franchise busi-
nesses. If you go into one of these quick-food franchise operations, you 
won't ~5ually see the franchisee operator sitting around. There is nothing 
in the record to indicate that Plaintiff performed the same services for 
other than Medexam. However, there is also nothing in the record to indi-
cate that Plaintiff did not and/or could not perform the same services for 
other than Medexam if he had so desired. 
All of the criteria from Alumiwall are satisfied with the possible 
exception of freedom to perform the same services for other than Medexam. 
In light of the other strong signs of independence in the record, such ele-
ment is not necessary. Also, in the typical franchise arrangement, such 
element will not be present. For instance, the owner of a "Big Boy" franchise 
i 5 not ab 1 e to perform the same "service" for some other franchisor, such as 
24Alumiwall Corp. v. Indiana Employment Security Board, 167 N.E. 2d 60 {1960). 
25North American Builders v. Unemployment Compensation Division, Id. 
15 
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"Burger King." It would seem clear that a franchisee in a franchise oper t' a 1~, 
clearly meets the "C" test as being customarily engaged in an independently 
established trade or profession, even though limited under his franchise 
agreement to use only the trade name of the franchisor. 
There are strong indications of the independent status of Plaintiff: 
I 
arising out of the circumstances of the termination of the business relat; 011• I 
ship between the parties. (R.0045) Mr. Smith of Medexam and the Plaintiff I 
terminated their business association by mutual agreement. It was not a 
case of an employer firing an employee. It was not a particularly unusual 
termination of a franchise relationship by mutual action of the parties. 
The parties discussed the matter in a conversation on July 21, 1977, and in 
a phone conversation on July 22, 1977, and the next day each wrote to the 
other indicating a mutual determination to terminate the relationship. 
(R.0045) Plaintiff voluntarily gave up his rights as franchisee. He could 
have actively pursued formalization of his business relationship with Medex11. 
He could have had his own attorney draw up a contract correctly stating the 
It is understandable that he franchise relationship between the parties. 
I 
balked at signing the partnership agreement submitted to him becau~e it just 
1
' 
didn't fit the situation. But instead of trying to get together w1th Medexil 
to go through the process (and it is a hard one and one often overlooked) 
of defining the relationship and clarifying where the parties stood, and 
reducing the same to writing, Plaintiff refused to attend meetings called by 
Medexam to discuss the contract and took an obstructive stance regarding 
negotiations rather than a positive, willing, helpful attitude towards the 
obviously necessary clarification and formalization of the relationship 
'ff between the parties. (R.0043-0044) Excerpts from the letters of Plaintl 
16 
I 
! 
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and Medexam at the time of the termination are illuminating as to the relation-
ship of the parties: 
Plaintiff's letter: 
... I hereby take full responsibility of making payment 
to my satellite~ in Pocatello, Idaho, Preston, Idaho, Logan, 
Utah, and Bount1ful, Utah; what is rightfully due to them 
per agreement between them and I for their.June 20th bill-
ing ... (R.0045 and 0025) · 
Plaintiff acknowledges that they were his satellites pursuant to an agreement 
between Plaintiff and the satellites. 
Mr. Smith's letter: 
In light of our conversation of the 21st, and your failure 
to attend four of our last five meetings, and your conver-
sation by telephone with me on the 22nd, I feel it necessary 
to terminate any and all business associations effective 
immediately. (R.0045 and 0025-a) 
The statement " ..• necessary to terminate any and all business associations 
effective immediately" sounds more like a relationship of franchisor-franchisee 
than employer-employee. If Plaintiff had been an employee, Smith would have 
said, "necessary to terminate you." 
POINT IV 
THE FACTS IN THE INSTANT CASE AS CONTAINED IN THE RECORD 
CLEARLY SUPPORT THE DECISION OF THE DEFENDANT BOARD OF 
REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION THAT PLAINTIFF WAS 
NOT IN THE "EMPLOYMENT" OF MEDEXAM WITHIN THE MEANING OF 
SECTION 22(j) OF THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT. 
Plaintiff did not receive any training from Medexam. He was com-
pletely qualified to do the physical examinations without any instruction 
or supervision as to the manner and means of accomplishing the same. (R.0037) 26 
Plaintiff could and did actively promote his own business. He 
contacted insurance agents directly to procure examination business. 
26see Footnote 42, infra. 
17 
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..• I would go out and procure--! would say, "Mr. Insur-
ance Agent, I would like to do these examinations that are 
required by your company." He would then call me. (R 0037 0048) • • 
Medexam did public relations in behalf of Plaintiff and set the 
price to be charged for the examinations. (R.0038) Both of these functions 
are common in franchising arrangements.27 
The forma 1 i ty whereby Medexam makes the fi na 1 arrangement with the 
insurance company and bills the insurance company is comparable to the 
arrangement in the North American Builders case. In that case the home-
owner for whom the work was done did not contract with the installer, but 
rather with the dealer. When the job was finished the homeowner paid the 
dealer, who then paid the installer in accordance with an agreed-upon for-
mula based upon siding installed, comparable to the formula for compensation 
of the Plaintiff at seventy percent or ninety percent of a fixed price for 
a physical examination. (R.0039) 28 
Plaintiff leased equipment from Medexam, including an EKG machine 
(R.0040), which is not consistent with an employer-employee relationship. 
It was the responsibility of Plaintiff to obtain his own license 
to conduct his business. (R.0040, 0049) 
Plaintiff solicited, interviewed, hired, trained, and paid exam-
iners to work for and under him in Brigham City, Preston, Idaho, Pocatello, 
Idaho, and Logan. He paid these examiners an amount agreed upon by Plain-
tiff and each examiner. (R.0041, 0042, 0049) 
Referee: You paid all of your own expenses.and how d~d. you arrive at the fee that was pa1d to the lndl-
viduals you hired? Did you set that fee? 
27see Footnote 3 and Footnote 6. 
28see Footnote 21. 
18 
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Blamires: I paid.them what I was suggested to pay them by 
Mr. Sm1th. 
Referee: In other words, if they decided not to work for 
that much, were you authorized out of your own 
90 percent to change the fee fn any way? 
Blamires: I could 
Referee: In other words, that was more or less within 
your control what you paid them? 
Bl ami res: Yes. 
Referee: Depending on your agreement with them? 
Blamires: Yes. (R.0042) 
Plaintiff admits that the relationship evolved to the point where 
he considered himself to be self-employed and he treated himself as self-
employed for tax purposes after consultation with his "tax man." (R.0042) 
Blamires: Later on, after we switched to the 90 percent, 
after talking to my tax man and in the course 
of many discussions, it evolved to the point 
where we realized that we were supposed to 
really be an independent contractor. (R.0043) 
Medexam required that Plaintiff attend some meetings but not for 
the purpose of training or asserting control over Plaintiff, but rather be-
cause Medexam's attorney was rightly insisting that there needed to be a 
clarification of the relationship between the parties, a meeting of the minds, 
and a written formalization of such understanding. (R.0043-0044) 
Plaintiff rented his own office in Ogden, paid the rent out of 
earnings of tr,e business, and hired and paid his own secretary. He signed 
for the office, "Craig Blamires, Medexam." He ordered a telephone and 
listed it under the name "Medexam." He asked Mr. Smith to guarantee the 
phone to avoid a $100.00 deposit. (R.0044) The listing in the name of 
Medexam on the office rental agreement and with the phone company is com-
pletely in line with the franchise arrangement between the parties. A 
19 
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franchisee would be expected to u~e the trade name that he had obtained 
;ights to in such instances. As respects the guarantee on the phone, it 
would appear simply to be a matter of Medexam doing a favor for Plaintiff 
to avoid putting out a $100.00 cash deposit. 
On one occas~on Mr. Smith of Medexam attempted to assert some 
minor controls over Plaintiff to rearran!:le Plaintiff:s office. Plaintiff's 
secretary firmly refused to allow such infringement upon Plaintiff's con-
trol over his business, including the arrangement of the office furniture, 
equipment, etc. (R.0044) 
Plaintiff paid his rent, his expenses including gas, office sup-
plies, and equipment, advertising costs, secretarial wages, his satellite 
operators, telephone, etc., through his own checking account and kept his 
own books and records regarding his business. (R.0042, 0047) 
The above stated facts amply support the decision of the Appeals 
Referee as affirmed and adopted by the Board of Review. Plaintiff was 
engaged in an independently established business. A service relationship 
under Section 22(j)(l) of the Act did not exist between Plaintiff and 
Medexam. If the Court should find otherwise and apply the ABC tests of 
Section 22(j)(5), the above facts clearly support the decision that under 
the "C" test and the North American Builders casi9 criteria, Plaintiff 
was customarily engaged in an independently established trade or profession. 
POINT V 
THE SERVICES PERFORMED BY PLAINTIFF ARE EXCLUDED FROM 
"EMPLOn1ENT" AS DEFINED IN THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
ACT UNDER THE "A" AND "B" TESTS OF THE "ABC" TEST OF 
SECTION 22(j)(5) OF THE ACT. 
29see Footnote 21, supra. 
20 
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The "A" and "B" tests are as follows: 
22(j)(5) Services performed by an individual for wages or 
~nde~ any contract of hire, written or oral, express or 
1mpl1ed, shall be deemed to be emploJment subjeot t• this 
act unless and until it is shown to the satisfaction of the 
commission that: 
(A) Such individual has been and will continue to be free 
from control or direction over the performance of such ser-
vices, both under his contract of hire and in fact; 
(B) Such service is either outside the usual course of the 
business for which such service is performed or that such 
service is performed outside of all the places of business 
of the enterprise for which such service is performed; and30 
• 
The "A" test refers to control. It must be control or direction 
over the performance of the service. In the case of Salt Lake T.rtbune PUb-
lishing Company v. Industrial Commission,31 the court considered the nature 
of the supervision exercised by the alleged employer (1) as to the method 
of doing the work, or (2) just as to the result. 
The Indiana Appellate Court in the Alumiwall case,32 quoted and 
followed in the North American Builders case, 33 qtnsidered the "A" control ,, 
test in some depth. The wording of the Indiana Act is almost identical with 
the Utah statute. The wording "to be free from control or direction over 
the performance" is exactly the same. Quoting from Alumiwall: 
30utah 
31see 
32see 
33see 
... the legislature in using the term "control or direc-
tion": 
"* * * intended the meaning given to these words in Webster's 
New International Dictionar. 'Control' is there defined as: 
4 To exercise restraining or directory influence over; to 
dominate; to regulate; hence to hold from action; to curb; 
Code Annotated 1953, 35-4-22(j )(5). 
Footnote 16, supra. 
Footnote 24, supra. 
Footnote 21, supra. 
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su~jec~; ?verpower.' :oire:tion' is defined as: (3) That 
wh1ch 1s 1mposed by d1rect1ng; a guiding or authoritative 
instruction; prescription; order; command.'" 
Under the facts above set forth the applicators were free 
t? perform the services.when and in such manner as they saw 
f1t. They provided the1r own tools and equipment, and 
could, if they so desired, hire helpers and determine the 
wage scale of such helpers. The only restriction was that 
they perform such services in a good and workmanlike man-
ner. Such restriction is inherent in all services performed 
by one for another. To hold that such a restriction is 
the retention of direction and control over such service 
so as to exclude it from provision (A) is against good 
reasoning and common sense. 
The statutory test as enacted by the legislature requires 
more than the mere power to have the applicators cease 
their performance of the service upon a showing that such 
service was not being performed in the manner in which it 
should be performed. There should be some control and 
direction over the manner, method, and means in which the 
services are performed.34 
The evidence in the record in the instant case is ample to support' 
the finding of the Commission that the "A" test was satisfied, i.e., that 
Plaintiff was free from direction and control by Medexam over the performancf 
of his work in performing physical examinations. In any event the evidence 
in the record is such that it cannot be said that the Commission must, as 
reasonable men, have found that the claimant was subject to such contro1. 35 
The court in Alumiwall was persuaded by the following elements 
indicative of freedom from control. The same elements are present in the 
instant case: 
(a) Freedom to perform the service when and in such manner as 
they saw fit. 
(b) Provide own tools and equipment. 
34see Footnote 24, supra. 
35see Footnote 18, supra. 
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(c) Could hire own helpers and determine Will scale ef said 
helpers. 
In his brief Plaintiff refers to the following as evidence of 
control exercised by Medexam: 
(a) Plaintiff originally star~ed working out of his .own home 
and then set up his own office--this does not indicate 
control. It is more indicative of an independent business. 
(b) Medexam set the price for the various types of physical 
examinations to be performed--such is common practice 
in franchise arrangements.36 
(c) The insurance companies paid Medexam who then paid Plain-
tiff seventy or ninety percent--the arrangement is comparable 
to that in the North American Builders case,37 where the 
court found there was no evidence of control over the 
performance where the homeowner paid the dealer who then 
paid the installer. 
(d) Medexam provided at no cost to Plaintiff various supplies 
and forms--such is normal in franchise operations. 
(e) Telephone was listed under the name of Medexam--also 
1 . f h. t• 38 norma 1n ranc 1se opera 1ons. 
(f) Medexam retained the phone after termination of the business 
relationship--when the relationship was terminated by mutual 
36see Footnote 6, supra. 
37see Footnote 28, supra. 
38 . . See d1scuss1on in Point IV. 
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agreement, Plaintiff stepped out and Medexam took over the 
office and phone.39 
(g) Mr. Smith, President of Medexam, tried to rearrange the 
Plaintiff's office on one occasion--Plaintiff's secretary 
firmly refused,40 indicating her understanding that Medexam 
did not have the right to exercise such control. 
(h) A copy of a writing was sent to Plaintiff41 referring to 
setting up of specific goals as a device to improve produc· 
tion--Mr. Smith explained that "it was not sent out as a 
memoranda or requirement to anybody except my own people" 
and that it did not relate to people in "partnership 
agreements" such as Plaintiff. (R.0045) In any event 
such general suggestions as to the efficacy of goal setting 
would not constitute control over the performance of the 
physical examinations. 
(i) There was some direct relationship between Medexam and the 
operators hired by Plaintiff--there is some ambiguity in 
the record regarding to whom the satellite operators were 
contracted. Plaintiff stated they signed an agreement 
with Medexam. (R.0049) Mr. Smith stated that "they were 
not contracted to Medexam, they were contracted to him 
(Plaintiff)." (R.0049) 
Blamires: As per Mr. Smith's advice, they w~re co~sidered independent contractors and per h1s adv1ce, I 
had them fill out a letter, basic form they had 
39see discussion in Point III. 
4Dsee R.0044 and Point IV. 
41Exhibit 2 (R.0026). 
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given me, just a sheet which said Medexam will 
do this and said that they will do this. (R.OOSO) 
The status of these satellite operators is beyond the scope 
of this appeal. They may have been independent contractors 
as designated by Plaintiff in the above quote. If they 
were, it would seem to further support the decision of the 
Commission that Plaintiff was independent and not subject 
to control of Medexam. 
As stated above in the Alumiwall case, "There should be some control and 
direction over the manner, method, and~ in which the services are per-
formed" (emphasis added). 42 None of the factors relied upon by Plaintiff 
mentioned above indicate control of any sort over the manner or method of 
performing the physical examinations. 
The Plaintiff refers to the Croecuneries of America v. Industrial. 
commission case. 43 The court in said case determined that the decision of 
the Commission was supported by the evidence. 
While there is dispute in the evidence as to the above facts, 
the evidence in the record clearly discloses that the Commis-
sion might reasonably have found that the claimant was not 
free from "contra 1" . . . 44 
The court therefore refused to upset the decision of the Commission. In the 
instant case there is certainly substantial evidence to support the decision 
of the Commission that Plaintiff was free from control as respects the method 
and means of performance. 
The Salt Lake Tribune Publishing Company v. Industrial. Commission 
case, 45 is similar to the Creameries of America case, supra, in that the 
42 See Footnote 34, supra. 
43 98 Ut. 571, 102 P. 2d 300 {1940). 
t{: I c. 
45 99 Ut. 259, 102 P. 2d 307 (1940). 
25 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
court refused to upset the decision of the Commission where it was "supported 
by substantial evidence." There was evidence in the Tribune case that the 
papercarriers were supervised as to the perfonnance of their work. There is 
no evidence of such supervision in the instant case. 
Coming now to the "B" test of the "ABC" test: 
{B) Such service is either outside the usual course of 
the business for which such service is performed or that 
such service is perfonned outside of all the places of 
business of the enterprise for which such service is per-
formed; and46 
It is true that Plaintiff as a franchisee operated his business 
under the trade name "Medexam" and the phone number was 1 is ted under the 
same name. However, such is characteristic of a franchise operation.47 
These factors did not make Plaintiff's office in Ogden a "place of business" 
of Medexam. As already mentioned,48 Plaintiff rented the office and ordered 
the phone using his own name together with the trade name "Medexam," hired 
his own secretary, purchased, rented, or leased the equipment, furnishings, · 
I 
and supplies, had his own checking account which he used to pay all of his 
expenses, kept his own books and records, etc. The record is clear that 
Plaintiff's office in Ogden was Plaintiff's place of business and not a 
place of business of Medexam. The Commission properly found, albeit not 
expressly but by implication, that the "B" test was satisfied. 
CONCLUSION 
A quote from the Indiana Appellate Court case of News Pub~ishi~ ' 
Company v. Verweire et az.49 pretty well sums up the position of Defendant 
in this case: 
46utah Code Annotated 1953, 35-4-22(j)(5)(B). 
47 see Point I. 
48see Point IV. 
4949 N.E. 2d 161 (1943). 
26 
-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
We recognize and approve the well-established rule that Acts 
of this kind should be liberally construed in order that the 
beneficent intent of the Legislature shall be made effective. 
On the other hand the intent of the Legislature may be des-
troyed through judicial interpretation which broadens such an 
Act to include persons never intended to have been so included. 
An examination of the facts in the case discloses that Plaintiff was not in 
"employment" as defined in the Act and case law. Plaintiff and Medexam occu• 
pied vis-a-vis each other a franchise relationship rather than employer-employee 
or partnership. Such relationship was not a "service" relationship under the 
Section 22(j)(l) test. If the court should find it necessary to go beyond the 
Section 22(j)(l) test and apply the ABC tests of Section 22(j)(5), each of 
said A, B, and C tests was amply satisfied as disclosed by the record. The 
criteria and elements for satisfying the "C" test as set forth in the North 
American Builders case have been followed and satisfied in the instant case. 
The decision of the Defendant Board of Review of the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, being supported by substantial evidence, should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Attorneys for Devendant 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Utah Attorney General 
FLOYD G. ASTIN 
WINSTON M. FAUX 
Special Assistants 
Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Defendant's 
Brief to Hess, van Wagenen, Page & Hess, Attorney for Plaintiff, 40 South 
125 East, Clearfield, Utah 84015, this day of • 197S. 
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